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ESSAY
OUR JURIES, OUR SELVES: THE POWER,
PERCEPTION, AND POLITICS OF THE
CIVIL JURY
Laura Gaston DooleyI
The modem American jury has a bipolar presence in the popular
consciousness. On the one hand, the jury is a cultural icon as revered
in the United States as the flag,' its contribution to democracy
equated to voting.2 On the other hand, the jury is reviled as an agent
of arbitrary injustice, its output considered evidence of the decline of
moral consensus. Controversial, high-profile jury verdicts in the last
few years have intensified the debate about the efficacy of the jury as
the principal decisionmaker in court-settled disputes.
This cultural ambivalence about the jury has significance beyond
the ongoing need to assess jury performance, because the modem
jury is the most diverse of our democratic bodies.3 After courts began
t Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. My thanks go to Akhil
Amar, Ian Ayres, Barbara Babcock, Jennifer Brown, Ed Gaffhey, Jack Hiller,JoEHen Lind,
Colleen Murphy, David Oppenheimer, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments on a previ-
ous draft, to the Stanford Law School faculty colloquium for useful feedback, to Lisa Meyer
and David Kuker for excellent research assistance, and especially to Ron Dooley for his
extraordinary insight and support.
1 Akhil Amar calls thejury the "paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of Rights ....
The jury summed up-indeed embodied-the ideals of populism, federalism, and civic
virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights." Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 (1991).
2 1 ALExIS DE TocQuEvnLE, DEMOCRACy IN AMFRicA 283 (Francis Bowen trans., Al-
fred A. Knopf 1976) (1840) ("Thejury system as it is understood in America appears to me
to be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal
suffrage. They are two instruments of equal power, which contribute to the supremacy of
the majority.").
3 As to gender diversity, a recent study reveals that in the federal courts of eight
major cities, women comprised an average of 52.875% of serving jurors, defined in the
study as a "qualified person reporting or on call to report to the courthouse forjury duty."
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE RELATIONSHIP OFJUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SER-
VICE TO JURY SYSTEM PRF.oRMANcE 3 n.4 (Janice T. Munsterman, Project Director, 1991)
[hereinafter JUROR FEES STUDY]. In the state courts serving the same metropolitan areas,
women comprised 53.75% of serving jurors. The cities surveyed were Bismarck, Boston,
Dallas, Denver, Montgomery, Phoenix, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. Id. app. D at DI.
The degree of racial diversity was much more varied. In Montgomery, for example,
African-Americans comprised 22% of serving jurors in state court and 23% in federal
court; in Washington, D.C., African-Americans comprised 65% and 73% of serving jurors
in state and federal court; in Bismarck, Boston, Phoenix, and Seattle, the percentage of
African-Americans hovered around 3% in both state and federal court, though other mi-
norities added somewhat to the diversity ofjuries in those cities. Id.
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to interpret constitutional mandates of equal protection and impartial
juries to require that women and minorities be included on juries, 4
the demographics ofjuries changed dramatically at a pace far exceed-
ing the diversification of legislatures, executive branches, or the
judiciary.5
But as this jurisprudence of inclusion developed, so too did re-
straints on jury power. The twentieth-century civil jury is subject to
legal restraints unknown to our constitutional framers and enjoys far
less prestige than its eighteenth-century ancestor. The confluence of
the dual trends toward inclusion and restraint creates some troubling
questions. What does it mean that the most diverse of our democratic
institutions is subject to increasing legal restraints and cultural dis-
dain? Is the treatment of the modem jury as an institution (now that
Although these numbers do not indicate the representation of women and minorities
on petitjuries, some diversity likely persists into the trial jury composition, especially given
the developing case law restricting the use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely
on the basis of race or gender. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
4 The Supreme Court has developed two strands of jurisprudence designed to en-
sure thatjuries will fairly represent the community from which they are drawn. The first is
derived from the Sixth Amendment guarantee of criminal trials by "impartial"juries, which
the Court reads to mean that jury venire pools must be drawn from a "fair cross section" of
the community. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). The Court does
not require, however, that the final jury chosen in any particular case be demographically
proportionate.
A more important tool in the movement toward representativeness has been the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been successfully invoked to
prevent the use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of their
race or gender. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex relT.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (declaring unconsti-
tutional the use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of gender); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing that use of peremptories to strike jurors on the
basis of race violates the federal constitution); see also infra notes 164-67 and accompanying
text.
5 Despite growing awareness of the gender gap in legislative bodies, the judiciary,
and the executive offices of government, the numbers are still vastly disproportionate. In
the 103d Congress, only six women served among the 100 members of the United States
Senate; only 47 women served among the 435 members of the House of Representatives.
In 1992, only 60 women held state-wide elective executive offices in the United States, and
only 1375 women served in state legislatures. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 268 (1992). As of 1988,
women comprised only 7.4% of the federal judiciary, and only 7.2% of statejudges. COM-
MISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION 6 (Hillary Rodham Clinton, Chair, 1988). See Carl Tobias, Closing the
Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1237 (1993) (noting that the gender gap
remains and suggesting solutions to the Clinton Administration).
The pace ofjury diversification has been far swifter. A 1968 survey ofjuror character-
istics performed by the American Bar Foundation found that 27% ofjurors serving in one
federal district court's accelerated docket were women; as noted above, the numbers of
women rose dramatically when 1990 survey results were tabulated from multiple districts.
Compare FREDRIC R MERRILL & LINUS SCHRAGE, A PILOT STUDY OF UTILIZATION OFJURORS 16
(1970) (giving 1968 figures for the Western District of Missouri) ZwithJUROR FEES STUDY,
supra note 3, at D1 (giving 1990 figures for multiple districts).
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women are routinely included) itself a manifestation of sexism?6 Does
the power distribution in the courtroom between judge and jury re-
flect a cultural privileging of the judge as the presumably "rational"
actor?
This Essay confronts these underlying questions by examining the
semiotics of the jury, as manifested both by its position within the
power structure of the civil courtroom and by the underlying ideology
that justifies and maintains that position. The procedural structure
within which the civil jury operates, together with the language that
manifests that structure, tell a story of a progressive cultural privileg-
ing ofjudicial rationality and distaste for perceived populist excesses.
Thus, the jury's power is held in check by procedural devices which
ensure thatjudges will have the last word, while its value as a trustwor-
thy decisionmaker is called into question by courtroom protocol and
rhetoric that casts it in feminine terms. Like women, juries are placed
on rhetorical pedestals yet are condescended to by the other actors in
the legal system.
Part I of this Essay examines the power distribution between jury
and judge established by procedural rules in the federal civil system 7
and demonstrates how that structure reinforces an ideology that privi-
leges the judge as the more rational decisionmaker. Part II analyzes
the way juries are spoken of, as well as the way jurors are spoken to, to
illustrate the cultural fear of jury irrationality. Modem judicial opin-
ions, legal scholarship, and the popular press frequently exhibit a
marked, if somewhat masked, disdain for the jury. An institution
whose presence on the colonial scene had often been a symbol of pop-
ulist revolt has inexorably beconie the signal of ethical breakdown,8
and even sometimes a laughingstock.9 In the name of so-called "ra-
tional" decisionmaking, the jury is marginalized by language that
6 Though advances injury diversification were consistently made for racial minorities
before they were made for women, the decline of the jury's prestige analyzed here no
doubt reflects both racism and sexism. This Essay focuses on sexism, without in any way
diminishing the possibility that racism plays a role. More broadly, the analysis points to
classism at work: judges are well-educated, middle- to upper-class individuals. Though ju-
rors are supposed to come from all walks of life, it is commonly believed that because
professionals are able to get out ofjury service more easily, the process may produce jury
compositions drawn disproportionately from lower economic classes and from those with
less formal education.
7 Since most state court procedural systems track the federal rules' jury restraint
mechanisms of directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding verdicts ("JNOV"), the
analysis presented applies to both state and federal courts.
8 See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 44-47.
9 In a recent Doonesbuy strip, Garry Trudeau depicts the questioning of a potential
juror.
Lawyer Ms. Luckenblatt, are you a professional? A decision maker?
Do you hold a position that carries any responsibility whatsoever?
Juror: Urn ... no. Not really.
1995]
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frames it as feminine. Allowing the judge to define rationality, by giv-
ing him' 0 the ability to set aside jury verdicts he considers irrational,
implies that juries, like women, tend toward the irrational, and must
constantly be monitored.
Finally, Part III proposes a possible historical explanation for the
modem cultural ambivalence toward the civil jury. It focuses on the
correlation between the development of a jurisprudence of inclusion
and the growth of procedural restraints that vest final power in judges
to check jury "irrationality."" While the civil jury's decline in modem
times has been widely acknowledged, 12 common theoretical explana-
tions have neglected this unsettling correlation.13 Part III suggests
that we must examine the shift toward privileging an idea of rational-
ity14 defined and enforced by judges if we want to understand why the
jury has been stripped, both functionally and rhetorically, of the
power and authority it once enjoyed.
The cultural critique presented here also has important implica-
tions for the future of the jury system. The marginalization of the jury
undermines the democratic vision of full participation and may dis-
courage citizen respect for the legal system in general. Current re-
straints on and proposed modifications to the jury system must take
into account its democratic value. In a legal world in which the jury is
the most diversified of the possible decisionmakers for most dis-
Lawyer: Are you informed? Educated? Articulate? Do you have any
opinions about anything? Anything at aiR
Juror: Well, I'm ... I'm not exactly sure...
Lawyer. She'll do, your honor.
Garry Trudeau, Doonesbury, CH. Tma., June 30, 1994, § 5, at 12.
10 I use the masculine pronoun "he" in recognition of the demographic fact that
judges still are predominantly male and to reinforce the semiotic analysis presented here,
which identifies the judge as the "male" actor in the courtroom power dynamic, regardless
of actual gender.
" See FED. PR Cirv. P. 50; infra notes 32-34, 37 and accompanying text.
In criminal trials, judges have the power to set aside jury verdicts of guilt when found
to be irrational, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), but must leave intact jury
acquittals due to the special restraints imposed by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the fed-
eral constitution. This one absolute power retained by the jury under modem procedural
systems is sometimes called the nullification power. It has given rise to a populist move-
ment aimed at requiring that juries be told they have this power. See Katherine Bishop,
Diverse Group Wants Juries to Follow Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at B16.
This Essay will focus on the civil jury, which operates under more rigid constraints
since it has no nullification power. However, because high-proffle criminal jury verdicts
are frequently the objects of public scorn, their impact on the cultural perception of the
jury as an institution is also considered.
12 See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
13 Cf Albert W. Ashuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the CiminalJuiy in the
United States, 61 U. CnI. L. REv. 867 (1994) (tracing decline of criminal jury's power).
14 For discussions of the gendered correspondences traditionally drawn in relation to
the concept of rationality, see Genevieve loyd, The Man of Reason, reprinted in WOMEN,
KNOWLEDGE AND REA=n (Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1992); MargaretJ. Radin, The
Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1712-1714 (1990).
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putes,' 5 its relative lack of power and clear authority has political fall-
out that can no longer be disregarded.
I
ANGEL OF THE CouRTRooM: THE POWER OF THE CIVIL JURY
The American public seems to have a love-hate relationship with
the institution of the civil jury. Popular literature reveals a cultural
ambiguity about whether a group of twelve laypersons are qualified to
handle legal disputes, especially potentially complex or difficult moral
ones. From the time of de Tocqueville's work16 to the newspaper op-
ed pages of the 1990s,' 7 the literature is replete with rhapsodic testa-
ments to the quintessentially democratic character of the American
jury. Yet the popular press, 18 the entertainment media, 19 and highly
esteemed legal scholars20 have bemoaned the unpredictability and the
15 The increasing diversification of the judiciary is laudable and important. But given
the relatively slow progress in that arena due to infrequent turnover and the realities of
political life, the jury will continue to be the more diverse decisionmaker for the foresee-
able future.
16 DE TOCoUEWLLE, supra note 2.
17 See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Today's Juror Must Cary the Baggage of Evoluing Values, CHI.
TmB., Mar. 21, 1994, § 1, at 13; Philip H. Corboy, Trust Juries in Awarding Damages, CHI.
Tm., Dec. 31, 1991, at 18 (letter to the editor) ("When the Founders planned out our civil
justice system, they entrusted the responsibility for determining the facts and assessing
damages to common people .... Their belief in the common sense of a neutral group of
ordinary people was so strong that they placed the right to trial by jury in the Constitution
itself."). For an op-ed focusing on criminal jury competence, see Paul H. Robinson, N'ot
Guilty'Isn't Always 'Innocent', CmI. Tim., Feb. 8, 1994, § 1, at 17. It is appropriate to disclose
that my own contribution to the public debate has been decidedly pro-jury. See Laura
Gaston Dooley, ThePublic Conscience in the Courtroom, INDiANAeoIs STAR, Mar. 7,1994, atA9
[hereinafter Dooley, The Public Conscience in the Courtroom]; Laura Gaston Dooley, The Impor-
tance of Diverse Juries, IND. LAw., May 18, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Dooley, The Importance of
Diverse Juries].
18 See, e.g., Nightline Friday Night Special (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1994), avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript No. 3315 [hereinafter Nightline Special] (comments
of Wendy Kaminer, attorney-author, Charles Krauthammer, essayistjournalist, and Alan
Dershowitz, law professor); see also Fred Reed, IfJury Finds Truth, It's Only By Accident, WASH.
TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1993 ("Having spent considerable time now watching our system of trial by
jury, a suspicion grows on me that it is unworkable and badly conceived.... [T]he whole
process appears philosophically disreputable, procedurally unsound, too influenced by
nonrational factors and a crap shoot.").
19 The comedian Dennis Miller says in an ad for his cable television show:. "The en-
tire American legal system is upside down. We have people's lives being determined by
twelve people in a room whose main goal in life is to wrap it up and get home in time to
watch reruns on the superstation." Advertisement, NEw YORKR, Apr. 25, 1994, at 91.
20 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
I confess that in my experience I have not foundjuries specially inspired for
the discovery of truth. I have not noticed that they could see further into
things or form a saner judgment than a sensible and well trainedjudge. I
have not found them freer from prejudice than an ordinary judge would
be. Indeed one reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of
negligence to them is what is precisely one of their gravest defects from the
point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into
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"irrational" behavior of juries. The long and continuing debate over
the efficacy of the jury manifests a major cultural ambivalence, a rever-
ence for the institution as a democratic ideal mixed with disdain for
the people who actually serve as jurors.21
Moreover, the ideology of jury-as-icon/jurors-as-fools plays out
both in the structural relationship between judge and jury in the civil
courtroom and in the language used to establish and perpetuate that
relationship. Modem procedural rules place the judge in a position
to control, even negate, civil jury action in the service of an ideal of
rationality. Indeed, so great is our fear of irrational decisionmaking
that most of us intuitively recoil at the idea of unchecked civil juries.
That intuition, of course, rests on a conviction that judges, either sin-
their verdict a certain amount-a very large amount, so far as I have ob-
served-of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law
in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community.
OLIVER W. HoLMEs, Law in Science and Science in Law, in THE HoLMEs READER 85, 96-97
(JuliusJ. Marke ed., 2d ed. Oceana 1964). In this quote we see Justice Holmes expressing
at once the reverence and disdain for the jury, the ambiguity that drives our cultural per-
ceptions of that institution.
The most famous judicial critic of the jury wasJudgeJerome Frank. SeeJEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 120 (1949) [hereinafter FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL]; JEROME FRAN, LAw
AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930) ("Thejury makes the orderly administration ofjustice
virtually impossible.") [hereinafter FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND].
21 On a recent Nightline special, Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz condemned
jury action in the acquittals of Lorena Bobbitt (who had admitted castrating her husband
but attributed the act to temporary insanity caused by his abuse of her) and in the hung
juries of Lyle and Erik Menendez (whose juries could not agree on whether they should be
convicted of murder or manslaughter in the killing of their parents who they claimed
abused them). At one point, Professor Dershowitz referred to the Menendez jurors as
"fools" and even suggested that the split on the jury may reflect that some of them had
been watching too much daytime television. See Nightline Specia4 supra note 18, at 16. Since
Erik'sjury split precisely along gender lines, Professor Dershowitz's comment takes on par-
ticular significance. Commentator Margaret Carlson struck a similar note in a Time maga-
zine essay: "The [Menendez] brothers went from parents who understood too much to a
jury that did." Margaret Carlson, That Killer Smie, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 76.
Another modern manifestation of this disdain can be seen in newspaper accounts of
jury damage awards. See, e.g.,John Murawski, The July's $10 Million Surprise, LEGAL TMES,
Feb. 15, 1993, at 6 (describing District of Columbia jury award to a medical malpractice
plaintiff, and quoting anonymous lawyer as saying that "this is the kind of verdict that the
tort-reform people take and say, 'this proves thatjuries are irrational and cannot be trusted
with decision-making' .... ."); see also Reed, supra note 18 (describing the "contempt in
which juries are held by both prosecution and defense" in criminal cases and attributing
that to "a belief that jurors are to be emotionally manipulated, like children of limited
intellect, rather than convinced by logic").
Though disdain for the jury has been building recently, it certainly is not new. Nearly
100 years ago, the famous fictional bartender and sooth-sayer Mr. Dooley (no relation) had
this to say about the competency of the layjury: "Whin th' case is all over, thejury'll pitch
th' testimony out iv th' window, an' consider three questions: 'Did Lootgert look as
though he'd kill his wife? Did his wife look as though she ought to be kilt? Isn't it time we
wint to supper?'" FINLEv P. DUNNE, MR. DooLw IN PEACE AND WAR 14145 (Boston, Small,
Maynard & Co. 1898), quoted inJAmEs P. LEviNE, JuREs AND PoLmcs ix (1992).
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gly or collectively,22 are more likely than jurors to have a handle on
rationality. And that conviction, in turn, mirrors a perception gap in
the wider culture along gender lines.23 Society's ambivalence about
the competence and usefulness ofjuries is both a manifestation of and
a metaphor for society's ambivalence about women and about what is
perceived as a feminine approach to decisionmaking. 24
This ideology has been fueled by the elitism of the bench and
bar,25 which has subtly shaped public perception of thejury. Thejury
has been cast as the "other"26 in the courtroom; its value and power
are directly and proportionately relative to that of the judge and ulti-
mately it is he who determines its contours. Thejury's sphere of influ-
ence is thus wholly externally controlled.
22 A trial judge who rejects a jury decision is usually subject to the control of the
appellate process; of course, then his judgment is reviewed only by other judges, not ju-
ries. See infra notes 33-34, 37 and accompanying text for discussion of civil procedural
devices that vest this control injudges. Most systems, including the federal courts, also give
judges the option of ordering new trials when the judge is dissatisfied with a jury verdict.
In a new trial, a new jury might be empaneled, and temporarily empowered, to hear the
case. But the control mechanisms remain in place then as well: the jurors are vindicated
only if they render a verdict that the judge leaves in place. See Craft v. Metromedia, 766
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985) (after two jury trials ended in verdicts for plaintiff, district court's
JNOV upheld), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
23 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has asked, "Is the judge 'male,' the jury 'female'?
Is the search for facts a feminine search for context and the search for legal principles a
masculine search for certainty and abstract rules?" Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Dif-
ferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 49
(1985). Indeed, my analysis demonstrates that the system does treat the jury's job as femi-
nine, and correspondingly limits its discretion even within its already limited sphere. To
hope for reform at the hand of the civil jury acting alone is naive, given the restraints on its
ultimate decisionmaking power in civil cases.
24 Cf Laura Gaston Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 VAi. U. L. REv. 405
(1991) (noting the difficulty in assessing any influence of a different voice of women as
jurors given the rigid format of the verdict process).
25 The cover of theJune 1994 issue of the American Bar AssociationJoural featured
this caption: "Has a Talk-Show Mentality Softened Jurors to Accept any Excuse?" The
featured article focused on the growth of criminal defenses based on past circumstances of
the accused. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 40.
26 The term "other" here is being used in its critical sense as the marginalized actor in
a two-part drama: the jury is important, useful, and esteemed only insofar as the primary
actor, the judge, deems it so in particular circumstances. More broadly, the culture per-
ceives the jury as "other" because it has been so portrayed by those who have the power to
shape popular consciousness.
Casting the jury as "other" corresponds to what feminist literary critics, including Si-
mone de Beauvoir, Mary Ellman, and Kate Millett, have long argued about the place of
women in literature. See, e.g., Cheryl B. Torsney, The Critical Quilt: Alternative Authority in
Feminist Criticism, in CoNTEMoRARY LITERARY THEORY 181 (G. Douglas Atkins & Laura Mor-
row eds., 1989) ("[T]hroughout literary history women have been conceived of as 'other,'
as somehow abnormal or deviant."); see alsoJosephine Donovan, Beyond the Net: Feminist
Criticism as a Moral Criticism, 17 DEN. Q. 40, 42 (1983) ("Sexist ideology necessarily pro-
motes the concept of woman-as-object or woman-as-other."); see generally MICHAEL THEUNIS-
SEN, THE OTHER: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF HuSSERL, HEIDEGGER, SARTRE, AND
BUBER (Christopher Macann trans., 1984).
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In the Victorian period, it was often argued that the social ar-
rangements of the day properly divided power, influence, and respon-
sibilities according to the relative attributes of men and women. Far
from being oppressed, the woman was said to exercise great power in
the domestic sphere, to which her feminine talents were particularly
well-suited. She was the "angel in the house,"2 7 and her ability to con-
trol her private world was supposed to satiate any general desire for
power that she might have. Of course, any power women had was
completely circumscribed by men (usually husband or father). The
limited sphere of her influence was always subject to external control.
The notion that Victorian women enjoyed a position of power in
the private sphere under the convention of the time seems quaint to
us now. But the same power dynamic that allowed for such an argu-
ment in the nineteenth century is reinventing itself in the twentieth-
century relationship between judge and jury in the courtroom. Be-
cause the judge always retains ultimate authority to override jury deci-
sions,28 he controls the jury's sphere of influence.
This power disparity did not always exist. In colonial times civil
juries were frequently entrusted to adjudicate both law and fact.
Although historical sources are scarce and sometimes inconsistent,
causing scholars to debate the precise lines of authority between judge
and jury in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century American
courtrooms, 2 9 one thing is clear: the authority of the jury vis-a-vis the
judge eroded in the late nineteenth century and especially in the
twentieth.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, sweeping changes in
courtroom procedures forced the creation of much more discrete
spheres of influence for judge and jury.3' Though "[tihe modifica-
27 See, e.g., Virginia Woolf, Professions for Women, reprinted in 2 NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
ENGLISH LIrRATaRE (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 16th ed. 1987) (citing a poem by that name
written by Coventry Patmore and published between 1854 and 1862).
28 See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (describing directed verdict andJNOV
procedures in civil cases).
29 Compare Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment 80 HARv. L.
Rv. 289, 299-310 (1966) (noting disparity ofjury power among states) with LEVINE, supra
note 21, at 24-25 ("UJ]urors had enormous leeway [in first half of the nineteenth century]
to draw on their own feelings about the cases in addition to the evidence laid out in the
courtroom.... This all changed in the latter part of the nineteenth century and during the
twentieth century [when] [p]rosecutors and judges gained more control over cases .... ").
30 SeeVALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGMnG THEJURY 38 (1986) ("Beginning about
1850, Americans' unfettered enthusiasm for the jury began to wane.").
31 In a recent article, law professor Al Alschuler and historian Andrew Deiss have
contributed greatly to the literature by undertaking the project of sketching a general his-
tory of the criminal jury's transformation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminaljury in the United States,
61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867 (1994). The authors conclude that the criminal jury's loss of its
power to decide legal, as opposed to factual, issues, along with the rise in plea bargaining,
weakened the societal role of criminaI juries. t. at 906-11, 921-27. Their historical work,
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dons of the jury trial in the several states differed in detail and in
timetable,.. . the decline of the jury from its exalted status at the
beginning of the [nineteenth] century was a general trend observable
in all the states."32 In particular, the authority of the jury to make
factual determinations was tempered by the judge's broadening power
to decide legal issues. This power shift manifested itself in the increas-
ing use of the special verdict, which circumscribesjuries' decisionmak-
ing by requiring specificity,3 3 and the directed verdict, which bypasses
the jury altogether when the judge finds the evidence to be one-
sided.3 4
The procedure authorizing a judge to "direct a verdict" in a case
in which he feels the evidence to be so one-sided as to compel a partic-
ular result might seem to conflict with the Seventh Amendment,
which "preserves" the right to jury trial in civil cases as it existed at
common law.35 Indeed, this problem provoked a constitutional chal-
lenge to the directed verdict procedure, a problem that the Supreme
Court finessed by characterizing the directed verdict as a legal, not
factual, issue, legal issues being within the province of the judge.36
The twentieth century also produced an even more forthright en-
croachment on jury power in the device of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, popularly known as the JNOV,3 7 which, as its
name suggests, allows the judge to override ajury verdict that he con-
cludes no reasonable jury could have reached. In other words, the
entry of aJNOV is tantamount to ajudicial holding that the jury in the
case acted unreasonably or irrationally in reaching its verdict.
The obvious conflict between this practice and the Seventh
Amendment's prohibition against reexamination of a jury verdict was
resolved by the Supreme Court in 1935,38 when it characterized the
which recognizes that the criminal jury declined as it diversified while suggesting "neither
cause nor effect, merely irony," id. at 868, supports my proposition that a connection can
be made between growing procedural restraints on the civil side and the increasing diver-
sity in jury composition.
32 Note, The Changing Role of the Juy in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE LJ. 170, 170-71
(1964).
33 HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 30, at 39.
34 See Note, supra note 32, at 173.
35 The Seventh Amendment reads, in its entirety: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."
36 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
37 The 1991 amendments to the Federal Rules change the Rule 50 nomenclature and
replace both the directed verdict and the JNOV with the term "judgment as a matter of
law." The name change is cosmetic only, however, both devices continue to operate in the
same manner as before the amendment. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), 50(b).
38 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). Interestingly,
constitutional approval of the JNOV came before explicit constitutional approval of the
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"asserted insufficiency of the evidence" as a "question of law to be
resolved by the court."3 9 As with the directed verdict procedure, the
judge was not usurping jury power or in any way "reexamining" its
behavior, but was merely rendering a legal decision on an issue of law.
This was justified by reference to the common law practice of "reserv-
ing questions of law arising during trials by jury and of taking verdicts
subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved."40
This adroit constitutional maneuver masks the very real power
coup manifested in the JNOV procedure.41 Once a directed verdict
motion is made at the close of all the evidence, the judge can submit
the case to the jury and hope that it will reach what he thinks is the
"rational" decision. If it does, then everyone is satisfied: the jury sys-
tem is vindicated as the people's voice in the courtroom, and the
judge may distance himself from a potentially difficult or unpopular
decision. 42 If the jury reaches a verdict for the other side, and the
judge considers the verdict "irrational" under his construction of the
evidence, then the judge can fall back on the JNOV device (provided
the losing side makes the appropriate motion) and enter what he has
all along considered the right verdict.43
Thus, the modem system places the judge in a position of virtu-
ally absolute authority in the civil courtroom, quite a departure from
the practice of the early days of the Republic. By enlarging the do-
main of "legal questions,"44 by recognizing devices that facilitate sec-
directed verdict in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); see infra notes 168-73
and accompanying text.
39 295 U.S. at 659.
40 Id. Thus, the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, in codifying the
JNOV, requires that a directed verdict motion be made before the case goes to the jury in
order to set up a later JNOV-the judge is "deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised" by the earlier motion for
directed verdict (now called motion for a judgment as a matter of law). FED. R. Civ. P.
50(b).
41 As an efficiency matter, using the JNOV instead of the directed verdict permits an
appellate court that disagrees with the trial judge to reinstate the jury verdict, obviating the
need for a new trial.
42 Professor Charles Clark recognized and extolled this function as the jury's chief
value, when he stated that the jury's "real advantage seems to be as a kind of safety valve for
the judicial system. It relieves the judges of the burden and the odium of deciding close
questions of fact in cases, such as personal injury actions, where the feelings of litigants are
apt to run high." Charles E. Clark, Comment, Union of Law and Equity and Trial by Jury
under the Codes, 32 YALE L.J. 707, 711 (1923); see also Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors:
Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U. L. REv. 1, 57 (1956) (jury "spares [the
judge] from making the harsh decisions that the sharp application of the law to the actual
facts of a hard case would often require").
43 This, of course, would be reviewable on appeal by otherjudges, as would the denial
of the motion forJNOV.
44 The strengthening of the summaryjudgment device as a method of case resolution
also decreases the impact ofjury participation in civil cases. In 1986, the Supreme Court
decided cases signaling its view that summaryjudgment is a procedural mechanism on par
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ond-guessing of jury decisions, 45 and by redefining the circumstances
under which that interference may occur, the legal system has quietly
but unquestionably eroded the power of the jury. And perhaps the
most remarkable aspect of the power redistribution is its relative ob-
scurity-few people seem to notice, much less mind. The facilitating
subtext is the widespread perception that juries are not quite smart
enough to pull off the decisionmaking job in difficult cases (that is,
cases in which the judge disagrees with the jury).
Moreover, the ideology reproduces itself effortlessly. Jury verdicts
that judges agree with are left in place, and the jury system is thought
to be strong and thriving. But by branding overturned verdicts as irra-
tional, the system allows judges to spurn jury power "for the good of
society." This deft rhetorical system plays out in the reasonable jury
standard: the errant jury is unreasonable, irrational, inflamed by pas-
sion-indeed, a menace to a civilized dispute resolution system.4 6
And of course, these dangerous decisionmaking groups now include,
by constitutional compulsion, women and minorities.47 The next sec-
tion explores how this power structure manifests itself in legal and
cultural discourse, in a continual process of reproducing and justify-
ing the subordinate position of the jury.
II
SIGNS OF (IR)RATioNALrn. THE PERCEPTION OF THE
AMERICAN JURY
The structural weakening of the civil jury was made possible by a
prevailing ideology that jury irrationality is a thing to be greatly
feared, and thus carefully controlled. That fear seems to have become
progressively more pronounced since the early days of the Republic,
with directed verdicts; both are meant to screen cases due to insufficient evidence as a
matter of law, thus obviating the need for jury trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
45 A study of reported federal court cases between 1938 and 1968 revealed that 1002
cases involved Rule 50. The win ratios for directed verdict motions in the district court
were 64.2% for individuals, 67.8% for corporations and 70.5% for the government (and
others). ForJNOVs, the win ratio was 33.8% for individuals, 42.4% for corporations, and
28.5% for the government (and others). William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure: Directed Verdicts and Judgments Notwithstanding Verdict, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 463
(1973).
46 See, e.g., FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 20, at 172-81.
47 For a discussion of the constitutional developments that led to the demographic
diversity of the civil jury, see infra text accompanying notes 147-67.
Interestingly, the very arguments that were raised in opposition to including women
on juries are now arguments made about the efficacy of the juries themselves. Professor
Babcock has pointed out that opponents argued women "would skew the otherwise reliable
factfinding process" and "would not be able to sustain the mental labor and intensity of the
work" ofjurors. See Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Juy
Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1168 (1993). Those same concerns animate the standard
for granting judgments as a matter of law in modem courts.
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and now manifests itself both in the language used to describe jury
behavior and in the signals sent to jurors by their treatment in the
courtroom. Perhaps the best evidence of the enormous hold this ide-
ology has is our aversion to any thought of abandoning the rationality
standard as a check on potential jury imprudence.
Moreover, there is an obvious parallel between the language used
by judges to describe juries that they believe to have decided a case
the wrong way and language commonly used to demean the decision-
making of women.48 Thus, juries are referred to as "easily swayed by
emotion" and "not given to hard logical thinking."49 Such rhetoric
validates the intuition fostered by the structural system of restraints on
juries: that indeed juror irrationality is an ever-present threat that
must be kept in constant check.
In reported opinions of the nineteenth century, courts often re-
ferred to jurors as "reasonable men" as though that characterization
was so natural and inevitable that it was almost a given. Juries were
romanticized; their supposed diversity in terms of drawing members
from different walks of life contributed to their prestige.5 0 Whatever
verdict ajury returned in those early days was presumably reasonable,
since the jury was made up of men who were themselves reasonable.
For example, in an 1881 case, the Supreme Court confirmed the jury's
48 In a dialogue between Gerald Torres and Donald Brewster, the connection be-
tween the stereotypes used to describe women and the language used to characterizejuries
is noted to demonstrate that "It]he jury is an ever present threat to the reality established
by the rest of the system." See Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries: Sepa-
rate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAw & INEQ.J. 171, 181 (1986). The possibility of
jury nullification in criminal trials (that is, once a criminal jury acquits a defendant, the
DoubleJeopardy Clause prohibits any court interference with the jury's decision) is, to the
authors, the way in which "jurors resist their subordination" just as "women resist their
subordination through feminism." I at 184.
On the civil side, however, there is no possibility of nullification; any civil jury decision
may be overridden by the judge. Thus, for civil jurors, there is no path of hegemonic
resistance, assuming that they might seek one. Moreover, given the absolute constraints
imposed on the civil jury, it is hard to conceive of that body as any threat to the hegemony.
Nor is there cause to celebrate the "humane law" of the jury, see i& at 180, at least in civil
cases, when that law has no inherent legitimacy apart from validation by a judge.
49 Id. at 181.
50 Consider, for example, this rhapsodic description of the jury, offered by the
Supreme Court in an early case:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of educa-
tion and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant,
the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply
their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw
a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great
effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and
safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single
judge.
R.R Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873).
[Vol. 80:325
POWER, PERCEPTION, AND POLITICS
right to interpret contractual language with this observation:
"[W] hatever sense the jury, as reasonable men, in the light of that
circumstance, would put upon it, might well be taken as the sense in
which it was understood by the company, to whose agent it was per-
sonally spoken, for that would be the sense in which it would be un-
derstood commonly by reasonable men in similar circumstances." 51
This rhetorical assumption of reasonableness began to erode at
the same time that procedural restraints on jury power began to de-
velop.52 By the early twentieth century the case law rhetoric about
juries was changing apace with the rise in judicial power.53 At this
point courts began to take a more evaluative stance in language about
the jury. References to jury action being "reasonable rather than ca-
pricious" 54 appeared, and instead of the assumed "reasonable jury,"
courts would declare that "the verdict of the jury was reasonable."55
The sense from more modem cases is that the paradigm shift is
complete: the earlier assumption of the reasonableness of juries has
been replaced with the assumption that juries are unreasonable, and
this assumption is brought to bear on a whole range of decisions made
about what goes on in courtrooms. For example, the Federal Rules of
Evidence rest on an assumption that the judge must protect the jury
from certain evidence lest the jurors allow their emotional reaction to
overpower their intellectual obligation to decide the case according to
the judge's instructions.56 Cases interpreting Rule 403 frequently re-
fer to the danger of inflaming the jury's passions.57 The subtext is
that jurors would lack the wherewithal to control an emotional re-
51 Insurance Co. v. Trefz, 104 U.S. 197, 204 (1881). The Court was answering the
defendant's challenge that it was improper for the Court to direct the jury that they could
consider the insured's lack of familiarity with the English language.
52 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (describing various procedural limita-
tions); see also infra notes 168-83 and accompanying text (charting historical development
of directed verdict procedure).
53 There are, of course, counterexamples. However, a discernible progression in the
rhetoric toward distrust of juries is evident. My claim is not that this rhetoric itself estab-
lishes the increasing dissatisfaction with thejury. Indeed, as explained above, the decline
of jury influence throughout the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth is
documentable and not even controversial. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
Rather, the rhetoric reflected and hastened the jury's decline and became part of the pat-
tern of marginalization.
54 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 220 (1931) (quoting M.H. Thomas
& Co. v. Hawthorne, 245 S.W. 966, 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)).
55 See, e.g., Cargill v. Duffy, 123 F. 721, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) (emphasis added).
56 FED. R. EvrD. 403 reads as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The preju-
dice which the rule is designed to prevent is jury emotionalism or irrationality."); see gener-
ally FED. R. Ev. 403 advisory committee's note.
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sponse; thus, the approach is to withhold information from them.
One is reminded of the archetypal scenario of the female shielded
from life's ugliness by a gallant male protector.5 8
During the process of voir dire, jurors are picked for a particular
case by the combined action of the lawyers, who exercise challenges,
and the judge, who must approve those challenges. The jurors them-
selves have no choice in the matter. Though they are paid, the piti-
fully small amount of the stipend, as compared to the salary paid
judges, reflects the relative worth assigned to these players by the legal
system. Moreover, jurors traditionally must be silent throughout the
trial, like women (and children) seen but not heard.59 Unlike judges,
jurors do not give reasons for the decisions they render. Juries are
thus stripped of their chance to give voice to their concerns, memori-
alize their reasoning, or defend their decisions against external attack.
One can see this same disdain in the profusion of attorney train-
ing manuals that are used to prepare lawyers to choose juries and to
try cases in front of them. 60 In addition to the blatant stereotyping of
the "expert advice" on choosing particular jurors for particular cases
based on their gender or ethnicity,61 there are subtler signals of con-
descension. Attorneys are taught that their dress, mannerisms, and
demeanor will greatly impact the jury. Even the best-prepared attor-
ney with the most compelling facts and a clear win on the law is told
he must worry about whether the jury will like him, lest the jury pun-
ish his client in disregard of their obligation. Again, the jury is
painted in feminine terms; it is an object to be wooed by the charms
of the attorney.62
Significantly, when judges decide to overrule jury verdicts, the
language they use mirrors the rhetoric that traditionally has marginal-
ized the intellectual and decisionmaking faculties of women.63 The
58 See, e.g., WALTER Scoi-r, IVANHOE (Edinburgh, A. Constable 1820). A more modem
manifestation of this archetypal scenario can be found in most any dime-store romance
novel.
59 Some modem reformers have started to push for greater jury participation at trial.
See Lis Wiehl, After 200 Years, the SilentJuror Learns to Talk, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1989, at B5.
60 For example, the 1994-95 Course Materials Guide of the National Institute for Trial
Advocacy includes a whole section on jury selection and persuasion. One advertised video-
tape, Advocacy and the Art of Storytelling, promises to teach attorneys how to "hold the jury's
attention while persuading them that yours is the true version of that story... you will
learn winning ways to compose and tell your story to yourjury." NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
TRIAL ADvocAcY, 1994-95 COURSE MATERIALS GUIDE 29.
61 See MELVIN BEuJi, MODERN TRIALS (1954), cited in REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE
JURY 122 (1983); Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 36.
62 Cf Torres & Brewster, supra note 48, at 184 ("Historically, the jury in this system...
had to be courted....").
63 For example, in the psychological literature, much attention has been directed to
exposing the fragmented approach of early moral theorists who based their ideas about
moral development on the behavior of men and then measured women by those stan-
[Vol. 80:325
1995] POWER, PERCEPTION, AND POLITICS 339
traditional stereotype of women is that they are irrational, emotional,
and passionate. Indeed, it was this stereotype that so long delayed
women's successful participation in the democratic exercises of both
jury service and voting.64 Once it was no longer politically possible to
exclude women from jury service outright, their power was more sub-
tly restrained by procedural devices that control, and rhetoric that
compromises, the institution that now included them.6 5 Now, like wo-
men, juries are called irrational, 66 emotional,67 and inflamed by pas-
dards. Carol Gilligan's work in debunking male-oriented theories of moral development
has been quite influential and is often cited in legal literature. See CAROL GiLuGAN, IN A
DriwmRENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Though
Gilligan's work has been criticized as essentialist, its importance as an expos6 of male-
centered evaluative processes has endured.
64 See generally Babcock, supra note 47, at 1168 ("Whether as lawyers or asjurors, it was
thought that women would not be able to sustain the mental labor and intensity of the
work and would constantly fall ill, causing mistrials and other inefficiencies in the
system.").
65 See supra notes 31.45 and accompanying text (discussing the rise in jury control
mechanisms).
66 See, e.g., Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 236 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("In fact, the verdict was irrational a distressingly fre-
quent occurrence in complex commercial cases, where the issues are remote from the
experience and understanding ofjurors. So clear is the verdict's unreasonableness that we
can order a new trial even thoughJudge Holderman, perhaps out of pique at our decision
reversing him, refused to do so.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989);
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1045 (4th Cir.
1987) ("In granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district court reasoned
that... it was 'simply irrational [for the jury] to find that Mercedes-Benz would not have
made any extra sales but for the illegal incentive program.' ") (emphasis added), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979)
("These procedures protect litigants from the risk of a jury reaching an 'irrational ver-
dict.") (emphasis added) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974)), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 929 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,
936 (E.D. Penn. 1979) ("The foregoing observations demonstrate why we reject... the
related argument that, in complex litigation, a right to trial by jury would carry with it the
'right to an irrational verdict.' Juries-like judges-may sometimes render irrational ver-
dicts, but in such an event the court serves as a check on the power of thejury.") (emphasis
added), rev'd, 631 F.2d 1069, 1090 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Proteus Books Ltd. v. Cherry
Lane Music Co., 873 F.2d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We agree with Judge Carter that the
jury's damage award to Proteus on this claim was unreasonable and unfounded.") (emphasis
added); United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Most importantly,
however, the government, unlike a defendant, may not rightfully seek the benefit of an
irrational verdict; although juries may freely temper the rigor of the law, they surely may
not enhance it.") (emphasis added); United States v. Michelena-Orovio, 702 F.2d 496, 507
(5th Cir. 1983) ("But it was irrational for the jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that
this lowly, non-English speaking seaman knew about the plan to distribute the marijuana in
the United States or had an intention ofjoining in any such plans.") (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984); O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1978) ("I find it hard to understand how the majority can say that the $170,000 jury
verdict is 'irrational or so high as to shock the judicial conscience.' " (quoting Batchkowsky
v. Penn Central Co., 525 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir. 1975))) (FeinbergJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); United States v. McGowan, 385 F. Supp. 956,
960 (D.N.J. 1974) ("Stated differently, the question is whether defendant is entitled to the
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sion.6s Of course, the juries branded by these demeaning feminine
terms are precisely those whose error it was to disagree with a presid-
ing judge on how a case should come out.
Interestingly, this modern assumption of unreasonableness that
underscores court opinions is often mixed rhetorically with high-
sounding homages to the importance and value of the jury. Like wo-
men, juries are put on pedestals in almost the same rhetorical breath
in which they are compromised. In the course of a single opinion,
courts may deferentially describe the hallowed place juries as an insti-
benefit of a conclusive presumption that a demonstrably irrational juy reached a rational
acquittal verdict.") (emphasis added).
One might argue that courts are forced to use this description ofjuries when verdicts
are set aside given that "rationality" and "reasonableness" of the verdict are the touch-
stones of the test in both criminal and civil cases. SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979) (standard for overturning criminal conviction is whether a "rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"); FED. R.
Crv. P. 50(a) (1) (judgment as a matter of law should be entered in a civil case when there
is "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that
issue"). Such an argument merely begs the question, though, since the judges (through
case decision and rules formulation) are setting the standard in the first place on an appar-
ent assumption that juries are potentially irrational actors.
67 See, e.g., Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1986) ("While the
judge is in fact the only entity that imposes sentence under the Florida scheme, his role is
to serve as a 'buffer where the jury allows emotion to override the duty of a deliberate deter-
mination' of the appropriate sentence.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added), rev'd sub
nom. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); United States v. Burch, 490 F.2d 1300, 1303
(8th Cir.) ("Among those counterbalancing factors, McCormick lists the danger that the
facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's emotions ofprudice, hostility, or sympathy.") (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); Fineman v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 266, 269 (D.N.J. 1991) ("The verdict in this matter is the
product of impermissible speculation, sympathy, and emotion. The jury decided this case
with its viscera, not its reasoning, and therefore permitting the verdict to stand would con-
stitute the gravest miscarriage ofjustice.") (emphasis added), affid, 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924,933
(E.D. Mich. 1976) ("The language 'as the Court may allow' seems only to be the formal
codification and reiteration of the Court's duty to review excessive verdicts and to attempt
to eliminate from the jury system the emotion and prejudice that may exist.") (emphasis
added).
68 Fleming v. County of Kane, Il., 898 F.2d 553, 561 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Under our
traditional standard, only in those circumstances where the jury damage award is 'mon-
strously excessive a product of passion and prejudice, or if there is no rational connection
between it and the evidence, may the trial court disturb it.' ") (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted) (first emphasis added); United States v. Peterson, 808 F.2d
969, 977 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Statements designed to appeal to the jury's emotions or to 'in-
flame the passions'or prejudices of the jury... are improper.") (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). Cf Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 n.12 (1971) ("There can be no justice
in a trial by jurors inflamed by passion, warped by prejudice, awed by violence, menaced by
the virulence of public opinion or manifestly biased by any influences operating either
openly or insidiously to such an extent as to poison the judgment and prevent the freedom
of fair action. Justice cannot be assured in a trial where other considerations enter the
minds of those who are to decide than the single desire to ascertain and declare the truth
according to the law and the evidence.") (quoting Crocker v. Justices of the Superior
Court, 208 Mass. 162, 178-79 (1911)) (emphasis added).
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tution occupy in our justice system while worrying about jury incom-
petence in a particular case.6 9 On the surface, this may seem to serve
the straightforward function of strengthening and reaffirming the in-
stitution by pruning away potential mistakes. But the rhetorical strat-
egy of mixing praise for the jury writ large with reproach for the
individual jury has much more far-reaching consequences. Given that
most consumers of the popular media will be exposed predominantly
to examples ofjury verdicts painted as wrong-headed, the cultural per-
ception is that jury decisionmaking is dangerous. And since the criti-
cism is tempered by purported esteem for juries, the people remain
unaware of the very real decline of this supposedly treasured demo-
cratic institution.
Not surprisingly, the rhetoric is strongest in cases that are at the
cutting edge of the law in terms of new substantive theories or high
monetary awards. Some spectacularly large punitive damage awards7o
in recent years have focused media attention on the civiljury.71 Much
69 This phenomenon is most starkly manifested in cases which courts have found to
be too complex for juries to handle. After ajury in a civil antitrust case deadlocked, for
example, the district court concluded that the case should be retried before the judge
alone. The court quoted a Supreme Court homage to the civiljury: " '[M]aintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our
history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to ajury trial should
be scrutinized with the utmost care.' " ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp.
423, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)), affid, 636
F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981). Yet the court struck the jury
demand on retrial, noting that the jury composition in the 10-month trial would likely
repeat itself. The jury, which included several housewives, a retiree, and workers whose
jury service did not jeopardize their jobs, had trouble, according to the court, "grasping
the concepts that were being discussed by the expert witnesses." Id. at 447. The court
concluded that jury trial in the case created a "substantial risk" of arbitrary decisionmak-
ing. Id. at 449. This concern about jury incompetence has also prompted courts to deny
jury demands in the first instance. In In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 103
(W.D. Wash. 1976), for example, a federal district court found that "a jury would not be a
rational and capable fact finder" in a securities fraud action. While acknowledging that
"It]here can be no doubt that jury trials are favored in civil litigation in this country," the
court worried that the anticipated four to six-month trial would limit "the availability of
employed persons to serve on [the] jury" and thus the case "would be heard by jurors who
have not had exposure to a contemporary commercial or business environment." IR. at
103-04.
70 See Debra Cassens Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt, A.BXA. J., May 1993, at 88; see
generally Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amend-
ment, and the Politics ofJuy Power, 91 COLUM. L. Rxv. 142, 142 (1991) ("At common law,
jurors possessed discretionary power to assess punitive damages, and their judgment was
not lightly questioned. It has been a consistent element of the tort reform agenda to strip
jurors of this historical power.").
71 For example, consider the media attention devoted to the $105 million verdict
against General Motors in the exploding truck case and the $3 billion punitive award to
Pennzoil in its litigation with Texaco, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987); see
David Everett, Verdict Shows Painful Path Ahead for GM, DEr. FREE PRESs, Feb. 5, 1993, at Al.
The jury verdict in the GM case was recently overturned by the Georgia Court of Appeals.
General Motors v. Mosley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). Warren Brown, Court Over-
turns Verdict Against GM in Crash Case, WASH. Posr, June 14, 1994, at DI.
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of this coverage pegs the jury as a major reason for the perceived liti-
gation explosion in modem society.72 The alarm about "skyrocket-
ing" jury awards73 contributes to public distrust of the jury institution.
Juries are considered too liberal with the purse; like the stereotypical
woman, juries are portrayed as unable to handle money sensibly.74
Judges have a special jury control mechanism, the remittitur,
which they may use when they believe damage awards to be unreason-
able. If, for example, a jury finds for a plaintiff in a tort case and the
judge agrees on liability but believes the damages set by the jury are
too high, he may order the damages reduced to the level he thinks
reasonable. 75 Remittitur cases provide some of the most patronizing
rhetoric about juries. For example, a trial judge in a libel case justi-
fied remittitur by citing his own observation of the plaintiffs testi-
mony and stating that "[t] o me, it is quite obvious that the jury was
inflamed by passion and prejudice in awarding the amount of dam-
ages .... ,"76 Even though the judge felt the jury was competent to
reach a verdict on liability (competent, in that he apparently agreed
with the result),77 he could control the amount of the verdict by re-
mittitur and even base that on his assessment of the testimony and
demeanor of a witness-a task usually considered within the sole prov-
ince of the jury. Indeed, the remittitur device has been used in cases
in which the judge directs a verdict for the plaintiff-so that the judge
is both controlling the initial verdict and essentially setting the dam-
age amount. 78 Under such circumstances, the jury seems to exist only
72 See Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice
Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
271.
73 See Supreme Court Review, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 523 (noting what a "broad
coalition of American business refer to as sky-rocketing and irrational jury awards in per-
sonal-injury and other civil lawsuits"); Moss, supra note 70, at 92. But when the prospect of
imposing substantive limits on punitive damage awards reached the Supreme Court, the
Court declined to place constitutional limits on the jury's discretion. See Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
74 There is evidence that the so-called litigation explosion is a myth. See, e.g., Remarks
of Marc Galanter before the National Conference of Bar Presidents on February 1, 1992,
reported in NJ. LJ., Feb. 24, 1992, at 15, 22 (noting that "research findings... suggest that
the world of product liability is shrinking rather than growing").
75 Technically, the judge orders a new trial that may be averted if the plaintiff agrees
to the reduction of damages. This practice was approved by the Supreme Court for use in
federal courts, though its converse, additur, in which ajury award is increased, is not al-
lowed. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
76 Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 382 F.2d 73, 77 (7th Cir. 1967) (appellate
court quoting trial judge's order). The libel defendant sought unsuccessfully on appeal to
use the trial judge's strong language to argue that the jury's finding on liability must also
be overruled. Id. at 75, 77.
77 The appellate court characterized the evidence on libel "very persuasive." Id. at 77.
78 See, e.g., De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 125 (1st
Cir. 1991). The appellate court stated that "when the trial judge performs verdict surgery
of this kind, an appellate court must be slow to interfere with the operation's outcome"
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as an empty form.7 9 Ironically, the jury is most prominently and
openly marginalized in the very cases in which the argument for com-
munity participation is perhaps strongest. When a society struggles to
weigh public safety against corporate stability, or individual harms
against the economic fallout of damage awards, the diversity of com-
munity voices in the courtroom becomes more, not less, vitalj. 0
Rhetoric compromising jury authority can be found outside court
opinions as well. Much legal scholarship, for example, has been quite
harsh in its assessment of the competency ofjuries to decide modem
disputes, especially private ones.8' The debate about the relative mer-
its of lay versus professional decisionmakers is not a new one, cer-
tainly, 2 but the modem discourse8 3 discloses a particular hostility
toward jurors' ability to comprehend the so-called complex cases of
the post-industrial age.
and that when "there exists no truly objective way to measure damages, the trial judge's
view is entitled to considerable deference." Id. Thus the court acknowledged the lack of
objectivity on the point but was not troubled by the encroachment on jury authority.
See also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The
Grimshaw court remitted to $3.5 million a punitive damage award of $125 million in a case
involving a death and injuries caused by the defective fuel tank on a Ford Pinto, despite
the jury's wholly "rational" conclusion that $125 million, being the amount the company
saved by not remedying the defect, was an appropriate sanction. Id. at 389-90 & n.17.
79 Ironically, the De Leon Lopez court praised the jury's ability to assess damages in
difficult cases: "IT]hejury system, which depends heavily on the common sense and col-
lective human experience ofjurors for a fair resolution of such quandaries, has rendered
yeoman service." 931 F.2d at 126. Yet the court approved the judge's reduction in award
with just a casual observation that "the very purpose of a remittitur is to neutralize passion
and prejudice insofar as such attributes may have caused an inflated jury award." Id. at
125.
80 Stephan Landsman makes the interesting argument that the early twentieth-cen-
tury civil jury performed the function of"humaniz[ing] the law" in a "backlash against one-
sided and harsh, judicially-created tort doctrines" that had developed toward the end of
the nineteenth century (particularly, contributory negligence as a bar to tort recovery).
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HAS-
TiNGS L.J. 579, 605 (1993). However, since at that point judges had procedural power to
overturn jury verdicts they disliked, the "humanizing" function ofjuries in the developing
tort law might be understood as a proxy for the input ofjudges who were also dissatisfied
with the harshness and one-sidedness of the contributory negligence rule.
81 The attack on jury competence has been mostly on the civil side, probably because
the criminal jury serves a buffer function between the state and the accused that is seen to
have separate constitutional significance.
82 Professor Yeazell points out that "the dispute about the jury's virtues is a venerable,
persistent, and defining institution both of the common law and of political discourse."
Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 87; see
also Note, With Love in Their Hearts but Reform on their Minds: How TiialJudges View the Civil
Jury, 4 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 178, 179 and n.12 (1968).
83 1 use the term modem to correspond to the time period from post-Civil War to the
present. This relates temporally to the movement toward inclusion of women and minori-
ties on juries which will be described in the next section.
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In 1894,84 Maximus A. Lesser published a book on the historical
development of the jury system in which he said, following "[t]he
weighty voice of SirJames Stephen," that 'judges ought to be and usu-
ally are men of greater intelligence, better education and more force
of mind, than jurors."85 Though examples like this of overt classism
are rare, mainstream scholarly skepticism about the competence of
the jury began to build after the turn of the twentieth century. A
movement for revival of "special juries"86 more qualified than com-
mon juries received a good deal of scholarly attention.8 7 Law reviews
began to publish an increasing number of articles about the delay pro-
duced by the civil jury system, establishing what Stephan Landsman
calls a "rhetoric of efficiency." 8
As this theme of jury inefficiency has evolved through this cen-
tury, its most ardent and articulate champions have been judges,
whose positions give their policy views extraordinary weight. Judge
84 The post-Civil War period witnessed the development both of a jurisprudence of
inclusiveness injury service and growing restraint on jury authority. See infra notes 142-82
and accompanying text.
85 MAXIMUS A. LESSER, THE HIsroIcA. DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 208-09
(Rochester, Lawyers' Coop. 1894). He then quotes Mr. Stephen:
I think that as far as skill and intelligence go, it would be impossible to have
a stronger tribunal than a jury of educated gentlemen presided over by a
competentjudge. I cannot, however, say much for the intelligence of small
shopkeepers and petty farmers, and whatever the fashion of the times may
say to the contrary, I think that the great bulk of the working classes are
altogether unfit to discharge judicial duties, nor do I believe that, rare ex-
ceptions excepted, a man who has to work hard all day long at a mechanical
trade will ever have either the memory, or the mental power, or the habits
of thought, necessary to retain, analyze, and arrange in his mind the evi-
dence of, say, twenty witnesses to a number of minute facts given perhaps
on two different days.
Id, at 210.
86 SeeJeannette E. Thatcher, Why Not Use the SpecialJuy?, 31 MwN. L. REv. 232, 234
(1947) (defining special jury as "a body of twelve men believed to possess better qualifica-
tions as triers of fact in certain types of cases, superiority of the individual jurors being
demonstrated by the nature of their respective trades or businesses").
87 See Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon"Jury, 35 IowA L. REV. 409 (1949).
For a more modem argument for special juries, see William V. Luneberg & Mark A.
Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with
the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887 (1981); Rita Sutton, Note, A
More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts: The SpecialJury, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 575.
88 See Landsman, supra note 80, at 611; see generally id. at 610-16 (discussing law review
literature on jury inefficiency). The first major article appeared in 1901. See Alfred C.
Coxe, The Trials ofJury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 286, 289 (1901). Coxe argued that the jury
lacked the capacity to decide complex cases. This theme was picked up in numerous arti-
cles later in the century; Professor Edson Sunderland in particular carried the torch for
greater judicial control ofjuries. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, The Ineffiency of the Ameri-
can Jury, 13 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1915); Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Specia4 29
YALE LJ. 253 (1920); Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Trying Issues, 5 TEx. L. REv. 18
(1926). Professor Landsman points out the questionable empirical bases for the jury criti-
cisms contained in the literature of that period.
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Jerome Frank,8 9 for example, was famously critical ofjuries.90 Of the
jury trial, he said "[a] better instrument could scarcely be imagined
for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard
of former decisions-utter unpredictability." 91 Jurors he described as
"notoriously gullible and impressionable" 92 and "hopelessly incompe-
tent as fact-finders;" 93 they are "neither able to, nor do they attempt
to, apply the instructions of the court."9 4 To explain the staying
power of such an obviously flawed institution, Judge Frank used a
gendered metaphor:
For while men want the law to be father-like, aloof, stern, coldly
impartial, they also want it to be flexible, understanding, human-
ized. The judges too emphatically announce that they are serving
the first of these wants. The public takes the judges seriously, as-
sumes that the judges will apply hard-and-fast law to human facts,
and turns to the jury for relief from such dehumanized justice.
... Judges, so conceived, are too terrifying. We dare not, says
the public, let them act thus in our affairs. The public turns, there-
fore, to a humanizing agency-thejury. Then they can have it both
ways. The judge, wearing a false-face, which makes him seem like
the child's stem father, gravely recites the impersonal and artificial
rules which command respect; but the juries decide the actual legal
controvesies.9 5
Judge Frank's Freudian notion ofjudge-as-archetypal-father illustrates
the sort of rhetorical compartmentalization of courtroom actors that
ultimately demeans both juries and common people in general: his
notion was that the public preferred the jury trial precisely because of
its anti-intellectual and illogical qualities. The "humanizing agency"
that tempers the stern judicial father must be the motherjury.9 6 And
while Judge Frank pushed for judges to acknowledge the impossibility
of perfectly logical decisionmaking, his disdain for the jury remained
steadfast; he forthrightly stated that "[t] he jury makes the orderly ad-
ministration of justice virtually impossible."97
89 Judge Frank served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
90 See generally FRANK, CouRrs ON TRLAL, supra note 20, at 116-20 (expressing skepti-
cism about jurors' ability to perform factfinding and law application functions).
91 FRANK, LAW AND TH= MODERN MND, supra note 20, at 172.
92 Id. at 179.
93 Id. at 180.
94 Id. at 172.
95 Id. at 175. Judge Frank was denouncing judges' "self-delusion" of"legal fixity, cer-
tainty and impartiality." Id. at 177.
96 Cf. HERMAN MELviLLE, Billy Budd, Foretpman, in FOUR SHORT NovELS 195 (Bantam
Classic 1963). In court-martial, members of the court were told that "[t]he heart is the
feminine in man, and hard though it be, she must here be ruled out" Id. at 261.
97 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 20, at 181.
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Judge Frank was not the only prominent twentieth-century jurist
to challenge the supremacy of the jury trial method.98 Chief Justice
Warren Burger's concern about the increasingly complex nature of
modern litigation and the delay in the federal courts led him to pick
up the banner for revamping civil jury trials. In a 1984 lecture, he
proposed that it was time to "inquire into the possibility of some alter-
natives to the traditional jury trial for the protracted civil trials of is-
sues which baffle all but the rarest of jurors who actually wind up in
the jury box."99 ChiefJustice Burger questioned whether modem ju-
ries are "truly representative" given that professionals, business execu-
tives, academics, and "others arguably more competent than most to
cope with complex economic or scientific questions rarely survive
[peremptory challenges] to sit in the box."100
Indeed, the complexity debate has eclipsed the earlier efficiency
debate to become the focus of dissatisfaction with the jury in recent
years.10' The scholarly discourse built to a crescendo in the late 1970s
and led to a decision by one of the circuit courts of appeals that liti-
gants' right to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, which
would be compromised by the use of ajury deemed incapable of han-
dling a highly complex case, trumps the Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial.'0 2 The Supreme Court has never directly considered the
issue of the relationship between due process and the right to jury
98 The ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of NewJersey delivered lectures at Boston
University in 1955 on the roles ofjudges andjurors. Though not nearly as critical ofjuries
as Judge Frank and Justice Burger, Justice Vanderbilt felt strongly about the need forjudi-
cial control ofjuries: "But the lay element cannot function without judicial guidance as to
the law; if the administration of justice in the courts is to be based on law the respective
functions and responsibilities of both judge and jury must be clearly recognized." Vander-
bilt, supra note 42, at 76.
99 Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkabk 31 Lov. L. REv. 205, 215-16 (1985) (Re-
marks of the ChiefJustice in the first Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Nov. 10,
1984).
100 Id. at 210. Of course, not alljudges agree with these views. Judge Higginbotham of
the Fifth Circuit entered the more recent complexity debate on the side ofjuries, noting
that "[a]part from the occasional situation in which a judge possesses unique training,
however, the assumption that a jury collectively has less ability to comprehend complex
material than does a single judge is an unjustified conclusion." Patrick Higginbotham,
Continuing the Dialogue: CivilJuries and the Allocation ofJudicial Power, 56 TEx. L. Rxv. 47, 53
(1977).
101 See, e.g., Symposium, Is the Juty Competen LAw & CoNTrEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
1. Professor Leon Green was one of the first to sound the alarm. In 1956, he noted that
"[a]s long as civil cases remained simple, and the issues were in the domain of the under-
standing of everyday citizens, jury trial both in England and in this country was relatively
satisfactory. But as civil cases became more complex and litigation brought within its vor-
tex the interests of an expanding commercial and industrial economy; as the significance
of these interests outran the understanding of laymen; ... many serious conflicts have
arisen within the jury process." Leon Green, Juy Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE LJ.
482, 483-84 (1956).
102 In reJapanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-85 (3d Cir. 1980).
As it turned out, the case was ultimately disposed of on summary judgment anyway.
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trial, and the debate is ongoing.'03 At the center of the debate, of
course, is not the competency of juries, but of jurors.10 4
The rhetoric about the supposed defects in the jury has recently
begun to capture the popular imagination as well, l05 largely due to a
103 See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial byJuty in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Morris S. Arnold, A Modest Replication to a
Lengthy Discourse 128 U. PA. L. REv. 986 (1980);James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin,
Complex Cases and Juy Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980);
Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L.
REv. 190 (1990); Richard 0. Lempert, CivilJuries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush toJudg-
ment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Frank M. Loo, Rationale for an Exception to the Seventh
Amendment Right to aJury TriaL In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 30 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 647 (1981).
104 Among attorneys,jury folklore and humorous stories abound, often framingjurors
as irresponsible and irrational. The following, written by a lawyer who does insurance de-
fense work, presents a fictional scenario of a widow suing an insurance company on her
husband's policy. The author says that "the followingjury instruction is not to be given,
but is always to be implied":
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. You are instructed as follows:
3. When you retire to the jury room, your first decision will be whether to
get down to business immediately, or whether to go out to lunch first (at
the county's expense). After returning from lunch, you will then begin
your discussions.
4. There probably will be a fat lady on the jury who will start by telling you
about her uncle who paid premiums on his life insurance policy for many
years. When he died, the company refused to pay on the policy for some
ridiculous reason....
6. You will then spend considerable time trading stories about insurance
companies. A truck driver on the jury will suddenly announce that'...
insurance companies are nothing but poop...."
7. You will then take a vote upon the widow's case, and bring in a verdict
for the full amount requested. This will take three minutes.
10. The ladies on the jury will then decide to take the widow out for cof-
fee and cake at the nearest coffee shop so that they can all have a good time
reviewing the exciting events of the day.
11. When everyone has left the courtroom, the attorney for the insurance
company will gather up his papers and put them into his briefcase, and he
will return silently to his office, wondering why he ever bothered to try the
case at all.
Lowell J. Myers, The Implied Jury Instruction, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1984, at 88-89.
105 Recent criminal trials have received sensationalized media attention. A jury's ac-
quittal of Lorena Bobbitt in the maiming of her allegedly abusive husband and the mistrial
in the Menendez cases based on the inability ofjurors to agree on a verdict in the murder
trial generated a great deal of publicity, much of it focused on the jurors themselves. Pro-
fessor Dershowitz dubbed the phenomenon ofjuries' refusal to convict in cases where the
victim had allegedly abused his attacker "the abuse excuse." See Goldberg, supra note 25, at
40. The cases gripped the public consciousness, and were featured several times on televi-
sion talk shows. The talk shows themselves became part of the story as well, with commen-
tators lamenting the so-called talk-show mentality of the public that was manifested in
these juries. See Nightline Specia4 supra note 18. For a response to that argument, see
Dooley, The Public Conscience in the Courtroom, supra note 17, at A9.
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few high-profile, controversial jury verdicts10 6 and to some political
stumping by those who feel that civil litigation is debilitating the econ-
omy.'0 7 Despite this condescension toward the jury, it would be wildly
inaccurate to claim that this is the only view.'08 Like case opinions,
the scholarly literature and the popular media are rich with glowing
references to the jury.10 9 The work of Hans Zeisel and Harry Kalven
as leaders of the University of Chicago Jury Project, in particular, is a
testament to the importance of the jury. Among their empirical find-
ings was the fact that judges agree with jury verdicts in both civil and
criminal cases approximately eighty percent of the time.110 The em-
pirical data generated by the project has been used to support de-
fenses of the competence of juries to decide cases."'
To the extent that the jury has enjoyed a scholarly renaissance in
recent years, though, it is operating under judicial restraints which are
now a given in our understanding of the institution. The jury of today
is distinctly not the jury of the pre-Civil War period. No matter what
one thinks of the merits of this evolution, the fact that the jury is today
a compromised institution cannot seriously be questioned. And the
connection between the emasculation of the jury and its increasingly
diverse personnel 12 may shed new light on the continuing story of
legal control ofjuries. In the next section, this Essay explores the pos-
106 The state-court criminal acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers accused of
beating motorist Rodney King is perhaps the most infamous jury verdict of our time. Inter-
estingly, the most common criticism of the King beating jury was that its judgment was
compromised by its lack of ethnic diversity. The trial had moved due to pretrial publicity
to the nearly all-white suburb of Simi Valley, California; the jury was made up of all whites.
The controversy surrounding this verdict had more to do with the problems associated
with limiting the decisionmaking body to one demographic group, though its infamy con-
tributes to the distrust ofjuries generally.
107 See Vice President Dan Quayle, Remarks at the American Bar Association meeting
in Atlanta (Aug. 13, 1991), in LEGAL Timxs, Aug. 19, 1991, at 9.
108 See, for example, the generally upbeat report of the American Bar Association-
Brookings Institution Symposium on the civil jury system, CHARTING A FUTuRE FOR THE
CIVILJURY SysTEM (1992).
109 In fact, Professor Priest makes the somewhat startling claim that "[o]ver the past
quarter century... support for the civil jury has become nearly unanimous" and attributes
this consensus to the work of the University of Chicago Jury Project. George Priest, The
Role of the Civil Juiy in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 162.
110 See HARRY KALVEN AND HANs ZEISEL, THE AMEICANJuRY (1966). This finding has
been used by both friends and foes of the jury, since it also means thatjuries and judges
disagree at least 20% of the time.
111 One of the most elegant of these was written by Harry Kalven himself, in which he
defended the margin ofjudge-jury disagreement. Harry Kalven,Jr., TheDignity of the Civil
Juty, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1065-66 (1964) (concluding that it is "the jury's sense of equity,
and not its relative competence, that is producing most of the disagreement" where it
exists).
112 Paul Carrington has noted that "any contemporary assessment of the jury ought
take account of the reality that 'community' in America is a pale imitation of the social
condition that gave rise to the institution of the jury. America is today far more an aggre-
gation of individuals than a community, and the conception of a verdict as an expression
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sibility of constructing a historical account that encompasses that
connection.
III
SOWING DIvERsTY, REAPING MARGINALrlY. THE POLITICS OF
THE CIVIL JURY
The story of the civil jury in America is a tale that mixes progress
in access for all citizens to this treasured civic duty with progressive
decline in the influence associated with that duty. This section traces
a historical sketch that highlights a possible connection between these
two progressions. The temporal fit is not perfect-there is no specific
point in time at which one can definitively mark either the downturn in
the jury's influence as an institution or the emergence ofjury access as
a key element of full democratic participation for women and minori-
ties. But the general progression of both these trends is document-
able, and the correspondence between them produces an unsettling
picture of an institution in decline during a period when its constitu-
ents were starting to change."13
In the earliest manifestations of the jury in medieval England,114
jurors were chosen for their expertise in the matters being tried. That
is, a local man who had independent information about the dispute at
hand was thought to be the best qualified to participate in its resolu-
tion.115 The idea thatjurors should come to their task with an impar-
tial mind and decide the case according to evidence presented to
them during trial did not develop until the latter part of the seven-
teenth century.116 By this point, of course, common law had evolved
into discrete forms of action that entitled private parties to recover for
of community morality is simply in most places quaint." Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh
Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 42.
113 In describing the general trend toward circumscribing the jury in the late nine-
teenth century, James P. Levine notes that "[tihe jury's freedom of action was also re-
stricted, perhaps in part as a result of the growing professionalism of the legal system and
the disdain that many prominent lawyers of the late-nineteenth century had for the na-
tion's growing masses." See LEvINE, supra note 21, at 25; see generallyJERoLD S. AuERmcsH,
UNEQUALJusTicE: LAwYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMEICA (1976) (describing
elitism of the legal profession through the turn of the twentieth century); see alsoAlbert W.
Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief Histoy of the CriminalJur in the United States, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 867 (1994) (describing criminal jury's loss of power to decide legal issues).
114 See generally Landsman, supra note 80, at 582-88 (recounting the history of the jury
in England). Juries of course had antecedents in the ancient Greek and Roman societies.
See generally MomusJ. BLOOMSIN, VERacr: THE JURY SYSTm (rev. ed. 1972).
115 SeeJoHN Gunmmit, THE JURY IN AMEmcA 16-17 (1988); BarbaraJ. Shapiro, "To a
Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGs LJ.
153, 155 (1986); see generally JAcK H. FIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 474 (1985); 1
SI WIL.IAM HoLDswoRTH, A HISrORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 332-50 (7th ed. 1956);
James B. Thayer, TheJuiy and Its Developmen4 5 HARv. L. Ray. 249 (1892).
116 GUINTHER, supra note 115, at 17-18.
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non-criminal acts; recovery theories that did not adhere to the recog-
nized forms were channeled to courts of equity which had no juries.117
In seventeenth-century England, the power dynamics of the
courtroom reflected the public's dissatisfaction with the Stuart monar-
chy, for which judges were perceived to be agents." 8 The English
legal system was being exported to the American colonies during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was during this period that
juries were often said to be judges of both fact and law." 9 Theough
the historical record fails to show unequivocally that juries enjoyed
unfettered discretion in colonial courtrooms, 20 there was a wide-
spread perception that juries were powerful democratic agents of the
people providing a counterweight to a potentially overreaching judici-
ary.' 2 1 Indeed, there is evidence that pre-Revolutionary American ju-
ries performed functions beyond what was required to decide
particular disputes.122
This reverence for the jury that motivated the early policymakers
of the new Republic was of course connected to the overriding intel-
lectual paradigm of the times: the notion that in the post-Enlighten-
ment world men were reasonable creatures who were capable of
117 Professor Guinther notes that to avoid dismissal from law courts, litigants, espe-
cially the wealthy, would take advantage of rampant official corruption which sometimes
included hiring the local sheriff to find a group ofjurors "paid to reach the desired ver-
dict." Id. at 21.
118 See Landsman, supra note 80, at 588-91; see also Austin W. Scott, Trial by Jury and the
Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 669, 675-78 (1918).
119 See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Rejections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 44; see also Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
YALE LJ. 170, 173 (1964). But see Henderson, supra note 29, at 299-310 (cataloging variety
of colonial approaches to the role of thejury). As late as 1805, in the impeachment trial of
Supreme CourtJustice Samuel Chase, one item of Chase's alleged misconduct was his re-
fusal to permit a lawyer to argue an issue of law to ajury, thereby undermining the jury's
power to decide issues of law. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 30, at 38.
120 Compare Note, supra note 32, at 173 and Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment
of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics ofjury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
142 (1991) (both arguing that eighteenth-century conception ofjuries was of a powerful
political body whose function was to check the possible corruption ofjudges) with Hender-
son, supra note 29 (arguing that there was no unifying vision ofjury power given the differ-
ent procedural checks on juries in the various colonial systems). See also Colleen P.
Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and CriminalJuries, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 723, 746-49 (1993).
121 See Scheiner, supra note 120, at 153.
122 Id. at 153 n.56 ("In pre-Revolutionary America, juries not only decided both law
and fact in litigation, but also performed various local government functions."); see also
Landsman, supra note 80, at 592 ("Massachusetts juries had responsibilities strikingly simi-
lar to those assigned juries in medieval England. They were the chief assessors of legal
claims and the primary enforcers of legal rights for their communities."); see generally FOR-
RES MCDONALD, Novus ORwo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 87 (1985) (describing the general status and function of the early American jury);
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SoCIErY, 1760-1830 (1975).
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discerning the natural law. 123 The Framers could trust that jurors
would reach "right" decisions; their efforts to protect the jury trial
right thus had more to do with concerns about concentrations of
power in single men (judges) than it did with the notion that laymen
would reach different kinds of judgments than would law-trained
judges. And of course in those days, the jurors looked just like the
judges-white, typically landowning men. 124 Women and minorities
were excluded from jury service.' 25 Given the cultural affinity be-
tween all the actors in the early legal system, the power struggle be-
tween judges and juries had little, if anything, to do with concern
about accuracy or abstractly correct results. Instead, it reflected the
general revolutionary conviction that power was best held in check
when diffused among many participants in the system. 126
Against this historical backdrop, the Framers of the American
Constitution included the right to jury trial in criminal cases. 127 The
right to jury trial in civil cases was guaranteed a few years later in the
Seventh Amendment, 28 as part of the Bill of Rights package. The
Seventh Amendment, which by its terms "preserves" the civil jury, en-
shrined that institution at a point in its history when it enjoyed relative
independence from the judiciary.129 Indeed, it was this characteristic
of the civil jury that elicited such passion from its defenders, the Anti-
123 Note, supra note 32, at 172 ("Since natural law was thought to be accessible to the
ordinary man, the theory invited eachjuror to inquire for himself whether a particular rule
of law was consonant with principles of higher law.").
124 William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Centuiy Background ofJohn Marshall's Constitutional
Jurisprudence 76 MicH. L. REv. 893, 918 n.140 (1978) (Jurors were chosen "by lot from a list
of freeholders, elected by the voters of the jurisdiction, or summoned by the sheriff from
among the bystanders at court.").
125 L wINE, supra note 21, at 24.
126 Akhil Amar characterizes a central concern of the Bill of Rights, particularly the
jury trial guarantees, as controlling agency costs, namely the possible self-dealing of govern-
ment agents. See Amar, supra note 1, at 1133.
127 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
128 The Seventh Amendment, ratified in 1791, reads:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONsT. amend VII. The Seventh Amendment applies only to civil actions brought in
federal court; unlike other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, it has never been held to con-
strain states' ability to structure their own civil justice systems.
129 Indeed, the omission of the civil jury trial guarantee from the text of the original
constitution nearly derailed ratification. The Antifederalists championed its inclusion and
in fact used its exclusion to argue that the proposed constitution would abolish civil jury
trials. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional Histoy of the Seventh Amendmen 57 MiNN.
L. REv. 639, 672 n.89 (1973). "For the Antifederalists, the civil jury would play a dual role
in the new Republic: it would protect the common people against the judges' biases in
favor of the government and the private ruling class, and also establish a small preserve of
direct self-government in the face of the remote Federal regime." Scheiner, supra note
120, at 144.
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federalists, who considered it the last bulwark against a judiciary
tainted by the British imperialist influence.'30 Moreover, the civil jury
was thought to provide an antidote to the tendency for judges in a
republic to favor wealthy, elite private litigants. 131 More broadly, the
Antifederalists who eventually won the fight for including the civil jury
trial 132 believed it to be the last and best bastion of true, direct democ-
racy-the one vehicle for the exercise of direct political power by
common people.133
At the heart of our constitutional jury trial guarantees, then, was
the populist notion that ordinary citizens were not just capable but
indeed were the best possible decisionmakers for most types of dis-
putes.13 4 Yet the authority of the jury in the courtroom was not even
then completely unregulated. 35 Eighteenth-century procedural prac-
tice included two mechanisms that directly controlled the authority of
civil juries: the demurrer to the evidence and the new trial.' 36 The
130 See 4 THE CoMPLET= ANTI-FEDERALIST 122 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981) ("Never
was the trial by jury in civil cases thought of so lightly in America as at this day. we have
bled for it, and are now almost ready to trifle it away ... ."); Scheiner, supra note 120, at
148-49; Wolfram, supra note 129, at 683. John Guinther posits that American colonists
were impressed "with the importance of the right to jury as a bulwark against official op-
pression" by the jury's acquittal ofJohn Peter Zenger in his seditious libel trial, and notes
that the denial of the right to jury trial in the Stamp Act and the Navigation Acts spurred
the Revolution. GUINTHER, supra note 115, at 30-31.
131 Scheiner, supra note 120, at 152; Wolfram, supra note 129, at 679-84. The paradigm
situation discussed in the ratification debates was the debt collection case. The Antifeder-
alists expressed concern that judges would favor creditors as members of their own social
class. See Scheiner, supra note 120, at 152.
132 See Wolfram, supra note 129, at 672.
133 Scheiner, supra note 120, at 153-54. A leading constitutional theorist of the time,
John Taylor, envisioned the jury as the lower chamber of a bicameral judiciary. Jom TAY-
LOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNrrED
STATES 209 (Dr. W. Stark ed., 1950); see also Amar, supra note 1, at 1189 (discussing func-
tional role ofjury in constitutional structure).
134 See Note, supra note 32, at 178 ("The proponents [ofjury trials in Massachusetts]
saw 'the people' as the only sure protection of the natural law standard.") But see Hender-
son, supra note 29, at 290 ("Nowhere in the history of the Philadelphia convention, the
ratifying conventions of the several states, or the specific 'legislative history' of the Bill of
Rights can any evidence be found that the relation of judge to jury was considered as
affected in any but the most general possible way by the seventh amendment, or even that
it was considered at all.").
135 See Murphy, supra note 120, at 747.
136 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (discussing historical analogues
to modem directed verdict procedures). In addition to the demurrer to the evidence and
motions for new trial, the device of nonsuit also allowed a defendant to challenge the
sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence, but did not prevent plaintiff from relitigating. Id. at
391-92 n.23; see also Henderson, supra note 29, at 300-01 (describing variety of colonial
procedures). There is evidence that special verdicts existed then as well. See Murphy, supra
note 120, at 760. In England, there was also a rule that complex cases should go to equity
court, which had no juries. See Burger, supra note 99, at 209 ("England, the source of our
common law, had, in 1791, a rule that if a civil case presented issues that were too complex
for the understanding of a 'ploughman' by which was meant the ordinary man, the case
was to be disposed of as in equity by a judge without a jury.") (citing Patrick Devlin, Juy
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demurrer to the evidence generally functioned by allowing a defen-
dant to concede the truth of plaintiff's evidence but argue that plain-
tiff was not entitled to recover. The risk to the defendant was that if
the court disagreed, the plaintiff was automatically entitled to a ver-
dict, given defendant's concession. 137 The motion for a new trial, like
its modem counterpart, 13 allowed a judge to set aside a jury verdict,
but preserved the right to ajury decision in the second trial. Because
the demurrer option was such a risky one, and because the new trial
did not undermine the authority of the jury as an institution (though
it obviously undermined the initial jury's authority), it is fair to say
that civil juries enjoyed the position of ultimate decisionmaker in
most legal disputes.'3 9
This deference to jury decisions was a product of a system set up
by men, designed to employ the rational faculties 140 of other men for
the benefit of still other men. Since only men participated in all as-
pects of the legal system, as judges, lawyers, jurors, and even typically
as litigants,141 they must have imagined that juries could provide ra-
tional, if not predictable, results. As the Massachusetts Supreme
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendmen 80 COLUM. L. REV.
43 (1980); Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980)).
137 Galloway, 319 U.S. at 393.
138 See FED. R. C(v. P. 59.
139 James Levine notes thatjuries had "power not only to decide the facts but to inter-
pret the law and to apply their own moral standards" and thatjuries "dominated the judi-
cial process" into the early nineteenth century. LEviNE, supra note 21, at 24; cf. Henderson,
supra note 29, at 299 ("A study of the decided cases in the thirteen original states shows
that, on the contrary, the power of the civil jury and the extent ofjudicial control over its
verdicts varied enormously and unsystematically from state to state."). Moreover, disputes
that were equitable in nature were, of course, decided by chancellors, the judges who sat in
courts of equity.
140 As Akhil Amar points out, our acceptance of judges' superior ability to consider
questions of law, including questions of constitutionality, stands in sharp contrast to "the
powerful and prevailing sense of 200 years ago that the Constitution was the people's law."
Amar, supra note 1, at 1195; see also Mark D. Howe,Juries asJudges of Criminal Law, 52 HAv.
L. REv. 582 (1939); Note, supra note 32 (noting widespread eighteenth-century belief that
juries had authority to judge both law and fact).
141 See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights"" A Bicenten-
nial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453, 511-12 (1992) ("The 'due process' guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment thus entitled its framers, mostly elite white men, to the procedures
and substantive rules of a legal system developed by and for people like themselves. At that
time, women and African Americans could not participate as either lawyers orjudges."); cf.
Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial
and Sexual Disadvantages in Employmen 79 GEO. LJ. 1659, 1681 (1991) ("My impression
[from the cases) is that it is much easier for federal judges to empathize with and find for
plaintiffs in age discrimination cases... since age discrimination plaintiffs are often elderly
professional white men like the judges themselves, people judges can easily imagine are
qualified. Juries do better than judges at empathizing with plaintiffs in employment dis-
crimination cases.").
1995] 353
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Court put it in an early nineteenth-century case, "the law presumes in-
telligence in the jury."142
The jury's rapid fall from grace over the course of the nineteenth
century, from virtual omnipotence to near subjugation, has often
been explained in theoretical terms, notably as a manifestation of the
emerging notion of law as science 43 and its emphasis on uniform,
predictable rules.1 44 Jury scholars Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar spec-
ulate that the decline in the jury's prestige is attributable to a combi-
nation of the fading image of its revolutionary heyday as a weapon
against English imperialist oppression and the rise in number of well-
trained judges.145 Many historians have posited that the rise in judi-
cial control of juries stems from the judiciary's concern that juries
might thwart industrial progress by returning verdicts against large
corporate interests.146 Each of these theories points to a sort of elit-
ism that began to poison nineteenth-century attitudes toward juries.
But they fail to account for a starker political reality connected to the
jury's descent.
Simply put, a correlation may be drawn between the decline of
jury influence and the inevitable post-Civil War change injury person-
nel: as the jury became an object of demographic diversification, re-
straints on its power also were tightening. The very institution that
was touted by constitutional framers as the bulwark of liberty had be-
come a dangerous vehicle for upsetting the status quo.
142 Commonwealth v. Child, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 252, 257 (1829) (emphasis added).
143 See generally AUERBACH, supra note 113, at 74-101 (documenting the intellectual his-
tory of law teaching in the late nineteenth century and its movement toward a view of law
as a "scientific enterprise").
144 See generally OuvER W. HoLMEs, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 237 (1920).
145 HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 30, at 38-39. The rise ofjudicial power vis-a-vis juries
also could be explained as a triumph of organized interests over less organized ones.
Judges and lawyers were forming professional groups to pursue their collective interests.
Jurors, of course, have no organized interest group. I am grateful to Akhil Amar for point-
ing to this explanation.
146 See Landsman, supra note 80, at 605-07 (citing MORTONJ. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1780-1860 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS Soci'-rY, 1760-1830
(1975); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151
(1946)).
Paul Carrington echoes this view, explaining that
The evolution ofjudicial control over jury verdicts was animated in part by
a concern for "reckonability" in commercial law. It was perceived that al-
lowing a party to a bargain to argue equities to a jury without the con-
straining effect of judicial oversight was too threatening to the value of
bargains. And a similar risk of aberrant, emotional decisionmaking in tort
actions may be to deter investment in activities that are exposed to tort
liability. Economic activity of all kinds is a function of social and political
stability that facilitates planning; nineteenth-century American law was
much concerned with encouraging economic activity.
Carrington, supra note 112, at 45.
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The rise of Jacksonian democracy and the trauma of the Civil
War forced the Republic into an era of reexamining its democratic
institutions toward the end of the nineteenth century. This period
witnessed a flurry of legislative activity centered on cementing consti-
tutional protections for newly-freed slaves. In particular, the Four-
teenth Amendment's 147 guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws to all men, including freed slaves, and the Fif-
teenth Amendment's 48 extension of the franchise to all men irrespec-
tive of race signaled the dawn of an era where exclusivity of
democratic institutions could no longer be assumed.
The assertion of the right of previously excluded groups to serve
on juries would not be far behind. In 1880, the Supreme Court held
in Strauder v. West Virginia 49 that a state statute barring African-Ameri-
cans from jury service violated an African-American defendant's right
to equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court's nod toward
more inclusive juries in Strauder, coupled with the constitutional guar-
antee of the right to vote which traditionally was connected to jury
service, signaled that juries would not continue to be the white male
bastion that they had been. 50 At about the same time, as the wo-
men's suffrage movement gained momentum in the United States,' 51
the fight for access to the vote was combined with demands for wo-
men's full participation in the entire democratic process, including
access to jury service.' 5 2
Given the convergence in the late nineteenth century of the so-
cial movements designed to benefit women and minorities (particu-
larly African-Americans), the growing distrust of juries during the
same period takes on a new significance. The movement toward limit-
ing jury power corresponds with the struggle of formerly excluded
groups to gain access to jury service. Since the judiciary was less re-
sponsive than juries to demographic diversification, 53 the rules favor-
147 U.S. CONST. Amend XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
148 U.S. CONST. Amend XV (ratified Feb. 3, 1870).
149 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
150 But as late as 1896, the Supreme Court upheld a law limiting prospective jurors to
male property owners. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 580 (1896).
151 See generallyJoEllen Lind, Dominance & Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for
the VotingRight, 5 U.C.L.A. WoMEN's L.. 70 (1994) (tracing history of suffrage movement).
152 See generallyJennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality,
102 YALE LJ. 2175 (1993) (discussing the differing interpretations of the meaning of suf-
frage that emerged as state courts considered whether women's new voting rights made
them eligible forjury service). The women's suffrage movement placed great emphasis on
the right to serve onjuries as essential to citizenship. See Babcock, supra note 47, at 1165
("[T]heir struggle was also about the right to serve onjuries. The two causes were the twin
indicia of full citizenship both in the minds of woman suffragists and in the attitudes of
American society.").
153 Akhil Amar pointed out to me that this is perhaps a transitional problem: once the
ranks ofjudges proportionately reflect the demographic makeup of society at large, then
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ing judge-controlled decisionmaking served to keep power in the
hands of the white male elite.
The duality of movement toward inclusiveness in jury participa-
tion and greater control ofjury behavior continued into the twentieth
century. On the inclusiveness front, advocates of jury diversification
successfully invoked two constitutional provisions in their demand for
juries that more accurately reflected the growing diversity of American
communities. First, the right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment in criminal trials was found to encompass a re-
quirement thatjuries be drawn from a "fair cross-section" of the com-
munity.154 Second, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was invoked to protect both the rights of litigants to trial
by juries from which members of their demographic group were not
barred per se and the rights of individuals to have access to jury
service. 155
One can find sporadic examples of state efforts to include women
injury pools from as early as the turn of the century,156 but the system-
atic effort began only after women had won a constitutional guarantee
of their right to vote in 1920.157 Although most states had legislatively
revoked the wholesale exclusion of women from jury pools,' 58 many
still granted women automatic exemptions from service, on the theory
that women's domestic responsibilities precluded prolonged absences
from home.159 Other schemes required women to indicate their de-
sire to serve as jurors by a registration or some other affirmative act,
with the net result that very few women were included in jury ser-
vice. 160 The Supreme Court upheld the former practice as late as
1961,161 but finally reversed its course in the seventies to hold that
rules favoring judges will no longer have that effect. It is likely, though, that even after
demographic representation has been achieved in the judiciary, classism will remain, since
judges will continue to come from the more privileged sectors of society. Moreover, the
power dynamic described here and in the previous section will continue to marginalize
juries and compromise their democratizing function in the courtroom. Pro-judge rules,
therefore, will still benefit a privileged, albeit more diverse, elite.
154 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
155 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
156 Utah was the first state to include women as jurors in state court trials, beginning in
1898. HA~s & VIDMAR, supra note 30, at 51.
157 IRL at 51-52. The Nineteenth Amendment reads in part: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex." U.S. CoNsT. amend XIX.
158 Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina retained their prohibitions against wo-
men jurors into the 1960s. HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 30, at 52.
159 Id.
160 I& at 52-53.
161 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), overruled in part byTaylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975). The defendant in Hoyt challenged her conviction for second-degree murder
in the killing of her husband on the ground that her all-male jury was not representative.
Despite the fact that the automatic exemption scheme in Florida resulted in the inclusion
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both affirmative registration schemes' 62 and automatic exemptions
for women summoned to serve 63 violate the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of an impartial jury.
Conquering the obstacles to inclusion on jury lists proved to be
only half the battle. The availability of peremptory challenges, which
allow litigators to strike members ofjury pools without any showing of
cause, continued to limit access of women and minorities to actual
jury service at trial. This last frontier of the fight for inclusion has
centered on equal protection challenges to discriminatory use of per-
emptories. In 1986, the Supreme Court held that litigators could not
- constitutionally use peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors
solely on account of their race.164 Later cases make clear that the
equal protection restraint on the use of peremptory challenges pro-
tects both the rights of litigants and of excluded jurors, 65 and applies
in both criminal and civil cases.166 The most recent decision regard-
ing the peremptory challenge occurred in 1994 when the Supreme
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the use of per-
emptory challenges based on gender.167
As was the case in the late nineteenth century, these twentieth-
century developments which angled toward more inclusive juries were
accompanied by tightening procedural restraints on jury power. The
directed verdict procedure, first introduced in the nineteenth cen-
tury,168 hit its stride in the twentieth. In the early days of the proce-
dure, the evidentiary standard used to gauge the appropriateness of a
of only 10 women on a 10,000 memberjury list, the Supreme Court rejected her claim. See
HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 30, at 52.
162 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down a provision of the Louisi-
ana constitution that required a woman to file a written declaration of her desire to be
eligible to serve on ajury).
163 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979) ("[S]ystematic exclusion of women
[produced by giving them an automatic exemption] that results injury venires averaging
less than 15% female violates the Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement.").
164 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
165 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
166 Batson was a criminal case; its rule was extended to apply to civil cases in Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
167 SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Interestingly, this case
involved a paternity suit in which a putative father objected to an all-female jury.
168 In Justice Black's dissent in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), he
identifies Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 372 (1850), as the first directed verdict case
considered by the United States Supreme Court: "[T]he [Parks] Court held that the di-
rected verdict serves the same purpose as the demurrer to the evidence, and that since
there was 'no evidence whatever' on the critical issue in the case, the directed verdict was
approved." Galloway, 319 U.S. at 401-02 (BlackJ, dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Justice
Black characterized the Parks decision as an "innovation," noting that only 15 years prior to
that case the Court had reiterated that courts "cannot legally give any instruction which
shall take from the jury the right of weighing the evidence and determining what effect it
shall have." Id. at 402 (quoting Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 298 (1835)).
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directed verdict was whether there existed even a "scintilla"' 69 of evi-
dence to support the likely loser's case. The introduction of virtually
any evidence rescued a litigant from the possibility of an unfavorable
directed verdict, and also preserved the jury's decisionmaking prov-
ince. 170 But by the turn of the century this standard had eased, so that
when a constitutional challenge to the procedure finally reached the
Supreme Court,' 7 ' directed verdicts were being granted whenever
there was a lack of "substantial" evidence to support the losing side.
Obviously, evaluating whether "substantial" evidence existed required
judges to weigh evidence in some sense; it was that invasion of the
traditional jury function that prompted the constitutional challenge.
In 1943, the Supreme Court held in Galloway v. United States172 that
the directed verdict procedure did not compromise the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases. Instead, the
Court said, the Framers intended the Seventh Amendment guarantee
to "preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most funda-
mental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details,
varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions." 73
Justice Black, a great defender of juries during a period when
that was not a fashionable intellectual stance,174 predictably dissented
in Galloway.175 Quoting Alexander Hamilton 176 and Patrick Henry177
169 See 319 U.S. at 404 (Black, J., dissenting).
170 See, e.g., Parks, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 373-74 ("There was no evidence whatever tend-
ing to show [that plaintiff was entitled to recover].").
171 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 372. This was a civil case in which a former serviceman
sued the government for disability benefits due on an insurance policy. The plaintiff,
against whom a verdict was directed, argued that he had a right under the Seventh Amend-
ment to jury trial on the issue of his mental disability, and that the directed verdict proce-
dure effectively deprived him of that constitutional right.
172 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
173 Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
174 This is the period during whichJudgeJerome Frank was writing his famous attacks
on the competency ofjuries. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL., supra note 20, at 120; FRANK,
LAw AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 20, at 181.
175 Justice Black also dissented in other cases in which he thought the right to jury trial
was compromised. See, e.g., Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 485 (1943) ("Truly,
appellate review ofjury verdicts by application of a supposed norm of reasonableness gives
rise to puzzling results.") (footnote omitted).
176 "Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist emphasized his loyalty to the jury system in
civil cases and declared thatjury verdicts should be re-examined, if at all, only 'by a second
jury, either by remanding the cause to the court below for a second trial of the fact, or by
directing an issue immediately out of the Supreme Court.' " 319 U.S. at 397 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 81 & 83).
177 "Henry, speaking in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, had expressed the
general conviction of the people of the Thirteen States when he said, 'Trial by jury is the
best appendage of freedom. We are told that we are to part with that trial by jury with
which our ancestors secured their lives and property. ... I hope we shall never be induced,
by such arguments, to part with that excellent mode of trial. No appeal can now be made
as to fact in common law suits. The unanimous verdict of impartial men cannot be reversed.' "
319 U.S. at 398 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Henry in 3 ELLoT's DErATEs 324,544 (1787)
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on the importance of preserving a jury's authority to render binding
verdicts, Justice Black surveyed the history of growing procedural re-
straint on jury power and passionately argued that the standard ap-
proved in Galloway "comes dangerously close" to a system in which
judges usurp even the most basic of jury responsibilities-weighing
the credibility of witnesses.'78 Justice Black's concerns were height-
ened when some years later, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure effectively codifying Galloway were approved by the
Supreme Court and submitted to Congress. 79 Joined by Justice
Douglas in his dissent to the rule changes, Justice Black lamented the
amendment's giving "formal sanction to the process by which the
courts have been wresting from juries the power to render verdicts"
and declared that "[ s]ince we do not approve of this sapping of the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee of ajury trial, we cannot join even
this technical coup de grace."' 80
Until very recently, the standard upon which judges based the
entry of either the directed verdict or the JNOV181 was left to case law
development. As the Galloway dissenters intimated, the standard
evolved from a very strict restraint on judges' ability to interfere with
the jury process (that the case should go to the jury if there exists a
"scintilla" of evidence to support the non-moving side)' 8 2 toward a
standard that is quite obscure and manipulable (that the case should
not go to the jury unless a "reasonable" or "rational" jury could find
for the non-moving side). Finally, in 1991, Congress amended the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to explicitly incorporate the "reason-
able jury" standard as the proper basis for a directed verdict or
JNOV.'83 Thus,just as the barriers to full participation begin to break
(emphasis added in Galloway dissent)). The vehemence of this rhetoric may, of course, be
a function of the predictable demographic characteristics of eighteenth centuryjurors. See
supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
178 Galloway, 319 U.S. at 405 (Black, J., dissenting).
179 See 374 U.S. 865 (1963).
180 Id. at 865, 866-67 (Statement of Black and DouglasJJ.). Thejustices reiterated the
concerns in the Galloway dissent that "judges have whittled away or denied the right of trial
by jury through the devices of directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding verdicts."
Id. at 866.
181 For a description of how a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, orJNOV, oper-
ates, see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
182 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 404 (Black, J., dissenting).
183 Rule 50 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an
issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable ju7y
to have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim that cannot under the con-
trolling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue.
1995] 359
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
down, and as the numbers of women and minorities in jury service
begin to show true proportionality to the population, the compro-
mised power of the civil jury has been encoded into the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
The intersection of the two jurisprudential trends that have domi-
nated the development of the jury in the last hundred or so years-
the movement toward inclusive juries and the growth of judicial re-
straint on jury power-produces an unsettling picture of a power
struggle along gender and racial lines. Acknowledging this political
truth forces a reexamination of jury restraint mechanisms that we
have come to accept as necessary and therefore constitutional.
Moreover, the semiotic dnalysis presented here prepares the field
for a more self-conscious appraisal of both the current system and pro-
posed reforms.18 4 The ideology ofjuror distrust that is facilitated and
reinforced by the rationality standard for evaluating jury decisionmak-
ing should no longer conceal the power dynamic in the modem
courtroom. The stark reality is that jury power is externally con-
trolled; if this is the justice system we prefer, we must openly acknowl-
edge its anti-democratic features.
If, on the other hand, we do not want to see the jury system limp
along in its present condition, we should demonstrate our respect for
the good faith and intellect of jurors by enlarging their sphere of in-
fluence in the courtroom. 8 5 For example, we might consider enlarg-
(b) Renewal of Motion for judgment after Trial; Alternative Motion for
New Trial.
Whenever a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made at the close of
all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determi-
nation of the legal questions raised by the motion.
FED. R Civ. P. 50 (as amended, 1991) (emphasis added). Rule 50 is drafted in such a way
as to allow judges to police the "reasonableness" ofjury decisionmaking without running
afoul of the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause; thus the rule characterizes evi-
dence sufficiency as a legal question.
184 See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85
Nw. U. L. REv. at 191-92 (1990) (describing two possible approaches to remedying dissatis-
faction with the jury system; the first would take cases away from jury, the second would
enlarge jury participation in the courtroom).
185 This seems to be the spirit of the Brookings Institution conference and report. See
Emily Courie,Jurors'Rights Endorsed, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1993, at 38 (quoting Marc Whitehead's
description of the Brookings Institution conference and report on American juries: "The
report may mark a major change in thinking of the jury as a pro-active participant in the
process rather than as a passive, absorbing listener."); see also Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethink-
ing the Juiy, 3 WM. & MARY BiLL OF RIGiSJ. 29, 87-106 (1994) (positing a communitarian
model of jury and extolling its participatory value).
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ing the universe of information available to jurors' 86 or giving jurors a
voice in information gathering. Most importantly, we must as a soci-
ety vigilantly ensure that our supposedly democratic institutions do
not simply mask power concentrations that we have not affirmatively
sanctioned.
186 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, LAw & CONTMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1989, at 247 (developing a theoretical model to determine when information
should and should not be withheld from jurors).
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